The program of a performing arts organisation can be seen as the result of an economic optimisation process (Frey and Pommerehne, 1990) . The decision-maker, making programmatic choices, pursues certain objectives. A discussion on the objectives of managers in the non-profit performing arts is in Section 2. Full realisation of these objectives is confined by budgetary constraints. Section 3 reviews the literature on the impact of budgetary changes on artistic programming. Section 4 uses a panel of Flemish theatres to analyse how budgetary changes affect programmatic choices. We account explicitly for the heterogeneity of theatre output:
programming corresponds to selecting a Lancasterian set of characteristics. A simultaneous equation approach is used also incorporating the behaviour of consumers and of the subsidizing government. A conclusion is in Section 5. 
Objectives of (non-profit) theatre managers
A theatre manager making programmatic choices will -in most general termsmaximise his/her utility under a set of constraints. Most economic models of nonprofit performing arts organisations assume that theatre managers are biased towards the maximization of artistic quality (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995) . The pursuit of quality can take many forms. A theatre director could opt for quality by programming innovative, less popular works that appeal only to the most 'refined' tastes. Quality could also be achieved by making the production of any work as impressive as possible, for example by a virtuoso performance, by lavish stage sets or costumes (Hansmann, 1981) .
Although the quality objective dominates in the literature, alternatives have been suggested. First, a theatre director could maximise audience size e.g. to spread culture to a broad segment of the population (Caves, 2000) . There may be a trade-off: a 'highbrow' (high quality) program may decrease audience sizes (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995) . Other alternatives to quality maximization are budget maximization (Hansmann, 1981, 347) 1 , acquiring legitimacy of the organisation (DiMaggio, 1987) or maximisation of the theatre manager's standing among his peers (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995) . The latter objective may reflect the existence of agency problems (Du Bois et al., 2004) .
1 His approach is in line with Niskanen's description of the budget maximising bureaucracy (Niskanen, 
Decision-making in the performing arts
A theatre manager faces constraints imposed by the 'artistic technology' and the budget. The latter is typically composed of three parts: the public's contribution in the form of ticket sales, corporate sponsoring and public subsidies. Changes in the technology, prices of inputs and/or the budget can be expected to lead to other programmatic choices. The cultural economics literature has focused on two issues:
the impact of subsidy on output and the effect of increasing costs (input prices) on the performing arts in general.
Several empirical studies examine the effect of government subsidy on one particular aspect of theatrical output, namely the extent to which the repertoire is diverse or innovative. The general assumption is that government support -as opposed to box office revenues or private donations -enhances artistic freedom and the possibility to experiment. Martorella (1975) gives the example of the Metropolitan and Lyric Opera of Chicago. These depend heavily on box office revenues. Their programming turns out to be 'conservative'. In contrast, the New York City Opera that has been subsidized by the National Council of the Arts and the Ford Foundation, has been able to commission new works and present avant-garde or rarely performed operas. Heilbrun (2001) suggests that the increasing diversity in the Canadian opera repertoire (as compared to decreasing diversity in the U.S.) is explained by the higher levels of public support. Pierce (2000) examines how variations in funding sources affect 'program conventionality' of U.S. opera companies. 'Conventionality' refers to the extent to which the program of an organisation is similar to the programs of other organisations. Local government funding significantly increases conventionality. A probable reason is that local politicians need to support programs that are popular. The opposite effect was found for support from the National Endowment for the Arts:
it decreases the conventionality of opera programming.
Theatre studies largely support the hypothesis that public support increases diversity.
Austen-Smith (1980) finds that subsidy encourages the presentation of minority interest plays in English provincial repertory theatres. In their study of American resident theatres, DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) show how a higher dependence on the market is associated with a greater conformity of repertoire. In a study on English theatres, O'Hagan and Neligan (2005) find a negative relationship between subsidy as a proportion of total income and the conventionality of theatre programs. Baumol and Baumol (1985b) analyse the effect of ever-increasing costs on the output of performing arts organisations. Their concept of the 'suppressed cost disease' is the less well-known brother of Baumol's cost disease. The intuition behind the latter is simple: (a) the labour intensive performing arts sector does not benefit from technological progress as much as other sectors and (b) the tendency for wages in the arts sector to follow wages elsewhere leads to ever-increasing costs (Baumol and Bowen, 1966) . When performing arts organisations make qualitative changes in their output due to cost pressures this is referred to as the suppressed form of the cost disease. As a general rule, we expect increasing labour costs to induce a shift within the artistic sector from highly labour intensive productions to less labour intensive productions. The cost disease leads then to a situation where performing arts institutions "debase the product" (Baumol and Baumol, 1985b, 222) . They may cut the number of rehearsals, perform in large capacity playhouses, use simpler sets … in the economically feasible range of (artistic) options. An obvious strategy is to reduce labour costs, since these typically make up for the largest part of total costs.
Assuming that wages are more or less fixed, this requires reducing labour input. One 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   6 way to do this is to produce plays with smaller casts. Still, it might be difficult to produce a certain play with fewer actors. In the words of Alan Peacock: "Removing Judge Bouck from the cast of Hedda Gabler would certainly reduce labour input to Ibsen's masterpiece, but it would also destroy the product" (Peacock, 1996, 219) .
But, of course, a change in the overall composition of the repertoire does make it possible to reduce labour input. Evidence by Baumol and Baumol (1985a; 1985b) shows that this is exactly what happened on Broadway: the average cast size of plays fell from 15,8 to 8,1 between 1946 and 1977 . Another cost-saving option that affects the repertoire mix is to choose fewer modern works for which copyright fees have to be paid (Throsby, 1996) .
Flemish theatres: 1980-2000
The Flemish professional theatre sector has gone through remarkable changes in the past decades. As will be shown, the plays that appear on stage today are clearly different from those that were programmed 20 years ago. Our analysis is restricted to those companies that have received 'structural' subsidies from the Flemish community. Altogether these represent the (rather) well-established and professional 2 We consider the seasons 1980-1981 until 2000-2001. In the remainder of this study, theatre seasons will be referred to by the first year mentioned (for example, the season 1993-1994 will be referred to by the year 1993). (Throsby, 1990 ).
Lancaster's characteristics approach then suggests itself as a tool of analysis (Lancaster, 1966) . Following this approach, a theatre production consists of a unique set of N characteristics z i (i = 1, …, N) like the language of the play, the period in which the play was written, the number of actors on stage, their identity, and so on: As these studies show, the choice of relevant characteristics to describe output is not straightforward. We identify several characteristics to describe qualitative aspects of individual theatre productions. The following 5 characteristics are considered 3 :
• z 1 : the original language of the play As these characteristics describe individual theatre productions, the relevant description of the program of a theatre for a whole season -a set of productions -can be seen in terms of an aggregation of these characteristics. To describe programmatic choices involving the quantity of output we look at:
• the number of productions
• the number of performances per production.
Werck and Heyndels (2005) 
The evolution of the budgetary situation
The budget of the Flemish theatres consists of two main sources: structural subsidies of the Flemish Community and own (box-office) income. 5 The former typically cover 5 Local governments -municipalities and provinces -also subsidize theatres. However, due
to the large number of missing data, we did not take these subsidies into account. uncertainty that was current practice before 1993 (Brouwers, 1994) .
The budgetary means of the Flemish theatres fluctuated over the years. After an initial decline in the early 80s the total available budget (subsidies and box office) for all subsidized theatres increased again to a maximum of €23,6 million in 1999 (in prices of 1996). The average theatre budget fluctuated between € 650.000 in the early 80s to almost € 946.000 in 1999. Naturally, the evolution in subsidies was largely responsible for these fluctuations: total subsidies fell from over €17,4 million in the early 80s to €13,4 million in 1986, after which they started to rise again. Average theatre subsidies were around € 572.000 in 1980 and increased to € 650.000 for the period 1997-2000.
Budgetary changes and Flemish theatre output
When making programmatic choices, the theatre manager has to take into account the constraints imposed by the public, by the subsidizing bodies and by its own technology. Depending on the objective(s) of the organisation, different hypotheses on the effect of budgetary changes can be made. A quality-maximising manager could be biased towards a theatre program that is artistically diverse (e.g. with a By retaking old productions, certain fixed production costs (such as scenery and costumes) can be avoided, and the number of rehearsals can possibly be limited.
However, it is a programmatic choice that quality-maximising theatre managers might be reluctant to make, as it does not enhance artistic diversity (Grinwis, 2002) .
Therefore, we expect such theatre managers to decrease the number of retakes when more budgetary means are available.
It is not straightforward to make a priori assumptions on the evolution of output characteristics under changing budgetary restrictions. The choice of repertoire -and the actors performing it -is one of the most important decisions to be made.
Reducing cast size seems an obvious way to reduce labour costs. Hence, a theatre manager may decrease (increase) cast size when confronted with a tightening (expanding) budget. Of course, when a quality-maximising manager regards large productions to be important, he will be reluctant to reduce average cast size.
Similarly, an audience-maximising manager will have a preference for large productions if they attract more theatregoers.
6 An audience-maximising manager is indifferent between programming n different plays with each one performance, or performing 1 production n times. Still, as programming a new production has sizeable fixed costs he will perform as few plays as possible (the constraint being that the play has to be popular enough to fill the theatre). The choice of a play that is contemporary, an adaptation of a classic play or of a play that is written by a Dutch-speaking playwright has less clear-cut budgetary implications. Still, cost-saving measures are possible, e.g. by programming fewer modern works for which copyright fees have to be paid (Throsby, 1996; Baumol and Baumol, 1985b) . Again, a quality-maximising theatre manager who regards innovation as indispensable will be less willing to take such a measure.
It is clear that programmatic choices are taken simultaneously. Moreover, decisionmaking is intrinsically interdependent if only because subsidizing bodies take into account (past) programmatic choices as well (Jenkins and Austen-Smith, 1987; Luksetich and Lange, 1995) . Politicians who decide on the level of subsidization face a re-election constraint. Therefore they may want to try and avoid drops in popular support. Theatre managers take this into account and will be careful not to provoke politicians, for example by falling short of box office income or by attracting negative publicity (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995) . Demand will also be affected by programmatic choices. Werck and Heyndels (2005) found that Flemish theatre attendance is positively affected by large cast sizes and plays written by Dutchspeaking playwrights. Expectations about consumers' reactions are likely to feed back into the programmatic decision-making, as attendance has a budgetary impact through the box-office.
Empirical analysis
Responses to budgetary changes are examined using data on all theatres that were subsidized during the period 1980-2000. Our data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 59 theatres. The set of theatres varies over time as some theatres cease to exist, (SUB i,t ), attendance (Q i,t ) and on the average ticket price charged (P i,t ). Table 1 gives a summary of the system of simultaneous equations.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The explanatory variables comprise theatre-specific and market specific determinants.
For the latter, a distinction is made between touring and non-touring theatres through a dummy variable, PLAYH i,t , which equals 1 when a company is residing in its own 7 The number of subsidized theatres in any given year varies between 24 and 35. (Revelli, 2001 (Revelli, , 2003 . Elements of the matrix, w jk , equal 1 if municipality k is part of the 'relevant market' for theatre i (located in j) and 0 otherwise. They find a preferred specification in which w jk =1 in the municipality where the theatre is located (j=k) as well as in its border sharing municipalities. We use this result for our own analysis. In practical terms, this means that POP i,t for a non-touring theatre i corresponds to the sum of the population in the municipality where i is located and in its neighbouring municipalities. Equations (1) to (7) are of central interest. The first two equations have the quantitative output variables as dependent variables. Equations (3) to (7) treat the output characteristics. Each output variable is estimated as a function of its own lag and the theatre's budget (BUDGET i,t ). 10 The budget consists of own (box-office) income and government subsidy. As mentioned, two regimes can be distinguished.
Until 1992 subsidies were allocated on a yearly basis. Since then, a 4-year allocation is in use. Responses to budgetary pressures may have changed. To take this into account we interact BUDGET i,t with a dummy DS t that identifies the subsidy regime.
DS t =1 in the years from 1993 onwards (4-year allocation regime) and 0 in the preceding period.
11 8 The relevant market's income is an average weighted by population. 9 In practice, movie theatres are only located in (relatively) large municipalities and not in their neighbouring municipalities. Hence, using or not using the spatial weighting matrix makes no difference. Formally, however, the 'relevant market' spreads over to neighbouring municipalities even if in these municipalities no substitute (cinema) is present.
10 A specification with the lagged value of the budget was estimated as well. The results were similar to those presented in the main text.
11 Following the current practice in empirical work on political budget cycles, we experimented with alternatives for DS. We defined a variable TUS t which gives the 'time until the following subsidy (1) to (7) as these are the main focus of our article.
A first observation is that, overall, the lagged variables of the output variables are highly significant, demonstrating that programmatic choices are strongly 'determined'
by choices from the past. This reflects that individual theatres have their own specific 'identity' as a result of which artistic choices show stability over time.
A second general finding is the apparent distinction between touring and non-touring (resident) companies. The latter program larger numbers of different productions.
This reflects the larger 'relevant' market of the touring companies. Since most theatregoers are not likely to attend the same production more than once, non-touring theatre companies are obliged to offer a 'diverse' program in order to attract potential theatregoers coming from within a certain distance from the playhouse. 13 As equation 4 shows, the playhouse dummy has a significant and positive effect on innovation:
non-touring theatre companies on average program more new productions. This might be explained by their more limited potential audience (smaller 'relevant market'). The proportion of 'Dutch' plays in the program is significantly lower for resident companies. A possible explanation is -again -that they are 'obliged' to present a more diverse program (as their 'relevant market' is smaller) in combination with the fact that the Dutch-language repertoire is limited relative to the overall theatre repertoire. 13 This result seems to be in line with the finding by DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) for U.S. resident theatres. They find that resident theatres with a larger market have a less 'conformist' repertoire. Of course, diversity as measured by the number of different productions is not the same as 'nonconformity' as measured by DiMaggio and Stenberg's Conformity Index. Turning to the impact of budgetary changes which are the focus of the current analysis two main conclusions can be drawn. First, we find clear evidence that the theatre's budget has an immediate impact on both the quantity and the nature of the output. Second, the introduction of the 4-year subsidy regime in 1993 has dramatically changed this relationship.
In the pre-1993 period (when subsidies where allocated on a yearly basis) budgetary changes translate into changes in the number of productions and the cast size (equations (1) and (3) respectively). Higher budgets are associated with more artistic diversity as reflected by the increased number of different productions. On the other hand, there is a negative but insignificant relationship between the budget and the average number of performances per production (equation 2). These results suggest that -given sufficient means -theatre managers prefer programming different productions rather than extending the average run of a production. As there is an obvious cost difference between staging a new production and programming an extra performance of an existing production, this result may reflect that Flemish theatre managers maximise quality (defined in terms of programmatic diversity) rather than quantity. Only when forced by the budgetary pressure, the number of productions will be lowered. Negative changes in the budget lead the theatre to lower the number of productions while keeping the average run constant.
Before 1993 the theatre's budgetary situation not only affects the artistic diversity in terms of the quantity of plays. Budgets also have systematic effects on the nature of these plays. Column (3) reveals a highly significant and positive relationship between a theatre's budget and the average cast size of the productions in a given season.
Increased budgets are used to expand cast sizes, probably by staging larger Baumol's (1985a; 1985b) findings on the so-called suppressed cost disease.
Under the yearly subsidy regime though, we find no significant budgetary influence on the proportion of new productions, the choice for contemporary plays, adaptations or plays written by a Dutch-speaking playwright.
After 1993, this situation changes dramatically with the introduction of the 4-yearly subsidies. While the responsiveness of the number of productions to budgetary changes is not significantly affected -also in the post 1993 period higher budgets lead to higher numbers of productions -for all other output variables we find a significant difference with the pre-1993 period. Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction term is significant in equations (2) to (7). First, BUDGET*DS has a negatively significant effect on the number of performances per production (RUN). During the 4-year regime higher budgets translate into less performances per production and (as in the pre-1993 period) into larger numbers of productions. This change in behavior is consistent with the observation that theatre managers work in a financially less risky environment. As they are assured of a sizeable part of their budgets they can 'afford'
to take the more costly and (in terms of ticket sales) risky decision to choose for new productions instead of longer runs.
14 Alternatively cast size expansions can reflect the situation where individual actors do no longer play multiple roles within one and the same play. While such a situation is not inexistent in Flemish theatres, it can by no means explain the empirical effect found in (6)) and more adaptations (equation (5)). Tighter budgets on the other hand induce (less risky) choices for older and well-established plays that are then performed in their 'original' version.
However, the tendency towards using the budget in order to present an artistically more risky program since the introduction of the 4-yearly subsidy regime is possibly contradicted by the observation in column (4). There we find that larger budgets in the post-1992 period lead to less innovation defined in terms of the share of new productions to retakes. Theatres received subsidies to spend on wages and general operations. They were obliged to spend minimally 90 % of their personnel expenses on actors and directors that were binded to the theatre by contract. Since 1993 this obligation is no longer present and, given that subsidies are allocated for 4-year periods, this seems to have changed the nature of the theatres' dependence on government subsidies.
Conclusions
Programmatic choices by theatre managers are not taken in isolation. Decisions on which plays to perform, what actors to attract, how often to perform a given play, … reflect the objectives pursued by theatre managers and the constraints they face. We We find that theatres' budgets have an impact not only on the number of plays they perform but also on their nature. While indirect, our results offer to our knowledge the first systematic empirical evidence of Baumol's suppressed cost disease. This notion refers to a qualitative change in the artistic output in the performing arts due to relative price changes. 17,64*** (10, 95) 1,71*** (9, 05) 0,46*** (13, 44) 0,06*** (3, 99) 78,98*** (7, 83) 0,24*** (7, 60) 0,63 (0, 13) -0,06 (-0,78) 78,09 (0, 58) Prod -1 0,65*** (18, 46) 0,01** (2, 46) Run -1 0,44*** (12, 25) -4,01E-03*** (-4,05) Cast -1 0,46*** (10, 43) 0,04*** (8, 45) Inno -1 0,31*** (7, 02) 0,23*** (4, 64) Adapt -1 0,33*** (7, 62) 0,07
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